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This study addresses the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity in auctions to improve
our estimates of the distribution of bidder values. The method uses reserve prices to allow the
distribution of bidders' private information to depend on the realization of the unobserved het-
erogeneity. The identifying assumption is that reserve prices are monotonic in the realization of
unobserved heterogeneity and sellers are not required to set reserve prices optimally. The model
can be estimated using only transaction prices. The paper proposes an estimation method and
derives the asymptotic distribution of the proposed estimator. Working with data on used car
auctions, the paper shows that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity aects estimates of the
distribution of bidder values and impacts predicted outcomes dramatically.
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1 Introduction
Empirical auction work often estimates the underlying model primitives of bidder preferences to
answer some counterfactual question. In this way the eld is similar to many other areas of applied
economics. However, as it has been recently noted (Einav and Nevo (2007) and Pakes (2008)),
empirical auction research has not kept pace with other empirical branches of economics in its
treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. In much of the empirical literature analyzing auctions
economists make the implicit assumption that their information set about the items to be auctioned
is the same as the auction participants' information set. This assumption is likely to be violated in
many applications. Several papers address the problem, but they require rich data sets, potentially
unpalatable modeling assumptions and ignore another potential source of information regarding the
objects' unobserved characteristics: seller behavior. In this paper I loosen these restrictions and
incorporate seller behavior in order to demonstrate how to obtain better, in the sense of consistency,
estimates of demand in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
When the auction literature does control for unobserved heterogeneity, it only uses information
from bidder behavior. The major insight that this paper brings is that we can also use information
from seller behavior. If bidders observe and respond to a characteristic about the object that the
econometrician cannot observe, it is likely that the seller, who as the object's owner is familiar with
its intricacies, also observes this characteristic. While empirical auction work has moved forward
by utilizing bidder behavior to grapple with unobserved heterogeneity, in this paper I show how
to use the behavior of the seller, such as the realizations of one of his choice variables, to recover
information about what the econometrician does not observe. One important choice variable of
a seller is his reserve price (the price below which he will not sell the item), and in this paper I
propose a general model of reserve price policy and bidding behavior that allows us to control for
unobserved item heterogeneity when estimating the distribution of bidder values.
I present a general nonparametric model of reserve price-setting and bidding behavior, show
that the model is identied and present Monte Carlo evidence that using reserve prices improves
our estimation of the distribution of bidder values in the presence of unobserved attributes. To
reduce dimensionality, I then introduce a single index that enters both the reserve pricing and
bidding functions and I show that the distribution of bidder values is identied in this model. I
then provide justications for the single index assumption, one of which is that oftentimes the
covariates entering the index are quality measures. Since I use this single index assumption in my
estimation, I derive the asymptotic distribution of my estimator of the distribution of bidder values.
I then apply my method in an analysis of Korean used car auctions which present a textbook
case for eorts to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity into our analysis. In these auctions owners
of used cars employ the services of an auction house to sell their vehicles to used car dealers via a
mechanism akin to an English button auction. I make sure to validate my modeling assumptions
in the context explored. Among others, I attempt to justify the single index assumption, that both
sellers and bidders observe and respond to what the economist does not observe, that conditional
on an automobile's attributes bidders have independent private values and that bidders have unit
2demands. I also show why these used car auctions are an interesting and appropriate market in
which to employ my methods. Aside from these auctions' importance to the overall automobile
industry (the value of automobiles sold by auctions in the U.S. was almost $89 billion in 2007
and used car dealers lled over 30% of their inventory via auctions), they are likely to be riddled
with unobserved heterogeneity. That is, even after controlling for observable dierences in cars,
like make, model, age and mileage, there are likely to be dierences in cars that are observable
to auction participants, but are unobservable to the econometrician. I then demonstrate that my
nonparametric estimates of the distribution of bidder values are dependent on the realization of
unobserved heterogeneity.
After performing the estimation, I turn to utilizing my estimates to answer policy and counterfac-
tual questions of interest and demonstrate the consequences of ignoring the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity in these investigations. First, reserve prices are shown to be particularly useful when
attempting to determine within-auction variation in bids when only single bids per auction are avail-
able in the data. On average, I show that utilizing reserve prices allows us to reduce our estimates
of the within-auction variation in bids by an average of 75%. Second, I show that the literature's
previously held belief that a failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overesti-
mate of the variation in bidder values, due to attributing too much variation in bids to variation
in values, does indeed hold in my estimation results. More generally, I show that when this is the
case, we will tend to overestimate the amount of surplus accruing to the winning bidder. In my
data, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overestimate of bidder surplus of approximately
30%. Third, I analyze the ramications of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the
optimal reserve price. In my data this can lead to a substantial drop in expected revenues and
an increased tendency for the item to go unsold. Fourth, I show that if the auction house faced
no cost of price discriminating, it would be optimal for it to charge each seller a xed fee and no
commission. In reality, the auction house charges a $50 xed fee and collects 4.4% of the winning
bid as commission. I claim that this is rational for the auction because of the costs it faces in de-
riving each car's optimal xed fee based on its characteristics. The auction house faces these costs
because of heterogeneity across automobiles, which it cannot observe without further inspection. I
then seek to estimate the maximum potential gains from switching to the 0-commission, individual
xed fee form of price discrimination from its current non-price-discriminatory pricing scheme. To
do this, I parameterize seller demand for the auction house and use its current pricing scheme to
uncover these parameters which can then be used to estimate the optimal xed fees in the absence
of inspection costs. I show that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity leads us to underestimate the
potential gains from price discriminating which may be more than 5% of current revenues per car.
As auctions are more frequently used, economists will be increasingly called upon to analyze their
outcomes and advise on their designs. In order to provide sound analysis and recommendations, it
is essential to control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. This research illustrates how
using reserve prices can assist in dealing with unobserved heterogeneity and shows how outcomes
of interest depend on our acknowledgment and handling of it.
3The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 places this paper in the context of the literature.
Section 3 introduces the modeling framework used for estimation and addresses several questions
of identication. Section 4 introduces the Korean automobile auction data. Section 5 discusses
estimation, illustrates its results and brings these results to bear on several policy relevant questions.
Section 6 concludes. Propositions and their proofs are presented in the appendix and all tables and
gures appear at the end.
2 Literature Review
Accounting for dierences in items being auctioned, which are unobservable to the econometrician,
is an outstanding issue in empirical auction research and presents serious complications for empirical
work. In this section I describe the existing literature on unobserved heterogeneity in auctions and
highlight how this paper advances the current body of work. These contributions are generally
a slackening of modeling restrictions and an easing of implementation through the use of seller
behavior.
While economists have methods for dealing with observable heterogeneity between items, there
is no universal approach for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. This problem is compounded
because auction participants generally have more information about the item for sale than the
researcher. The often unstated assumption is that the economists' information set about the object
coincides perfectly with that of the bidders, aside from their private signals, and therefore that
any variation in bids across similar objects \on paper" derives solely from variation in bidder
values. Recently there have been several attempts to deal with this issue. (Campo, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2003), Bajari and Ye (2003), Hong and Shum (2002), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006),
Krasnokutskaya (2009) and Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004)). The rst three papers use information
provided by the number of bidders. The rst in this group assumes that the number of bidders is
a sucient statistic for the unobserved heterogeneity while the second parametrizes the median of
the bid distribution as being normally distributed with a mean dependent on the number of bidders
in an auction.
In a very dierent approach to that presented here, Krasnokutskaya (2009) cleverly apples
deconvolution techniques, the roots of which can be found in Li and Vuong (1998), and Li, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2000) in the auction literature, to address unobserved heterogeneity. Like this paper,
Krasnokutskaya's semiparametric method, which has recently been applied by other researchers,
such as in Asker (2008), allows the unobserved heterogeneity to vary within auctions with the same
number of bidders. However, there are several dierences between our models. First, if she wishes to
allow for asymmetric bidders, she requires data on multiple bids from the same auction to identify
the distribution of bidder' signals, where as my method, though it requires data on reserve prices
(or as will be discussed below, potentially other seller choice variables) only necessitates having data
on the winning bid in an auction as well as the identity of the winner and second highest bidder.
If symmetry is imposed her method can be adapted to the case with reserve prices as is done in
4Decarolis (2009).1 Second, her method assumes that a bidder's value (or cost since she is looking
at procurement auctions, specically highway maintenance and paving contracts) is the product
of a bidder's private cost and a common unobserved component/cost.2 I, on the other hand, do
not require specifying the functional relationship between private and common signals. Third, she
requires bidders' signals to be distributed independently from the common component, where as I
allow signals to depend on the unobserved common component.
Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006) present a similar idea for handling unobserved heterogeneity.
Their paper is focused on developing a test for private vs. common values and in it they address
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in a similar way to this paper by modeling the number
of bidders as being strictly increasing in the unobserved heterogeneity. They address the potential
selection problem that participation may signal high unobservable realizations of the unobserved
heterogeneity (which would happen if the value of the object needed to pass some threshold in
order to be auctioned), something that I do not focus on in this paper. However, dealing with this
selection problem may prove to be easier in this case since reserve prices are continuous, as opposed
to the discreteness of the number of bidders.3 Moreover, they do not employ the single index model
used below.
In another attempt to address the presence of unobserved auction level heterogeneity, Athey,
Levin, and Seira (2004), in their study of timber auctions, assume a parametric form for the dis-
tribution of bids conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity. They then assume a distribution
for this unobserved heterogeneity and form the unconditional likelihood based on their parametric
assumptions. They also assume, which I do not, that the unobserved heterogeneity is orthogonal
to the observable characteristics of the item being auctioned. The benet of their specication of
the distribution of bids conditional on unobserved heterogeneity and the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity is that when they recover the model's parameters using maximum likelihood, the un-
observed heterogeneity term integrates out. Later, however, the authors still must incorporate the
parameterized, and now estimated, distribution of unobserved heterogeneity when they run simu-
lations. The authors readily admit that some of these assumptions are strong, in particular that
the realization of unobserved heterogeneity is orthogonal to the observable item characteristics, but
they defend such assumptions as being palatable \in light of most empirical work on auctions, which
makes the even stronger assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity at all." Moreover,
the authors provide substantial evidence that their parameterization is appropriate by comparing
predicted and actual bid residuals.4
1A more exible version of her model is presented in Hu, McAdams, and Shum (2009) but they require data on
three bids in an auction.
2As she notes, this multiplicative form assumption is justied if one believes that the cost distribution for the item
is scaled by the common component, thus aecting the mean and variance of the cost distribution similarly. She
also introduces a slightly less restrictive form in which the mean and variance of the cost distribution are aected by
the common component in orthogonal ways by letting there be a two-dimensional common component: one aecting
average cost and one aecting the individual cost deviations, though this requires the stronger assumption that both
components of the common shock are distributed independently from one another as well as from the private signals.
3I thank Phil Haile for pointing this out.
4In another defense of the authors' empirical work, their goal is to calibrate the distribution of bidder values in what
are likely to be competitive (sealed) auctions to then make out-of-sample predictions to assess the competitiveness of
5While it may be tempting to suggest a \xed eects" approach to the problem, a common
solution to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in other applied elds, there are at least three
concerns with this proposal. First, using a linear model to incorporate the xed eects may be
unattractive in certain applications. Second, if we suggest a nonlinear incorporation of the xed
eects then we introduce the familiar \incidental parameters" problem, originally addressed in
Neyman and Scott (1948), which leads to bias in the parameter estimates. Third, often economists
do not have the luxury of possessing multiple bids per auction, as is the case in the empirical
application in this paper, yet we still wish to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
Evidenced by the aforementioned literature, the current attempts to deal with unobserved auc-
tion heterogeneity use only bidder behavior. One might wonder whether we can use the behavior of
another auction participant, who also observes what the econometrician does not, to grapple with
unobserved heterogeneity. This paper seeks to answer this question in the armative through the
utilization of seller behavior.5 Although this proposal and its details will be explained below, I
reference a gure from a seminal paper in the empirical auction literature as motivation: Figure 3
from Laont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995), which can be found on p. 978 in their Appendix A. The
paper looks at Dutch auctions of eggplants in France. The picture lists the auctions in chronological
order and plots for each one the winning bid and reserve price which clearly move in tandem. While
in a Dutch auction, unlike the English auction studied below, changes in the winning bid might be
induced solely by exogenous variation in reserve price, if this were the case, one would also expect
variation in the fraction of items sold, which according to the authors does not happen. Therefore,
while the auctions may seem similar on paper, there is likely to be something that is dierent from
auction to auction which is recognized and responded to by seller and bidder alike.
The similarity between existing work in structural industrial organization should be noted.
Using reserve prices to \control" for unobserved heterogeneity in the bidding functions closely
mirrors the conceptual framework of Olley and Pakes (1996) and was originally suggested to be of
use in auctions by Athey and Haile (2006). Another related attempt to use this approach in the
structural econometric auction literature is by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), which relies on
monotonicity of the unobserved heterogeneity in the number of bidders. One advantage of using
reserve prices over the number of bidders is that many times the number of potential bidders in an
auction is unobservable.
It is important to note that while this section has highlighted the ways in which I attempt
to advance the literature, the current techniques of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity clearly
demonstrate the penalty of ignoring its presence in our models. The results of Krasnokutskaya
(2009) and Asker (2008) elucidate the severity of \assuming the problem away" in their estimation
other potentially collusive (open) auctions.
5In my use of seller behavior, a paper which is more tangentially related is Lewis (2007)'s analysis of eBay Motors.
In his model the seller has private information which is signaled to the bidders and the economist observes this signal.
In this way Lewis considers a dierent signaling game altogether and while my model is more restricted than his since
I do not allow the seller to have this private information, I provide support for this presumption in the empirical
application. Another important dierence is that the information bidders have about the automobiles varies in Lewis
(2007), thereby justifying a common values model, whereas in the application below there is no reason to think that
bidder's information sets vary. I provide further justication for the private values approach below.
6of mark-ups in government procurement auctions and the measurement of damages from bidding
rings.6
3 The Model
In this section I explain my strategy for using variation in the reserve price to account for un-
observed heterogeneity in auctions. The model makes the reasonable assumption that while the
econometrician may not be able to observe everything bidders do, it is likely that sellers have this
information. Moreover, if this information is important to bidders, and thus aects how they bid, it
is likely also to aect how the seller sets his reserve price. Therefore, I will use variation in the re-
serve price to help identify the unobserved heterogeneity across items. However, in so doing, I wish
to avoid making stringent assumptions about seller behavior. For example, one major assumption
that I wish to avoid making is that sellers set their reserve price optimally. This is because even if
they knew how to do this, it is not clear what their objective function is in many contexts since the
most frequently used optimal reserve pricing formula relies on the seller being a monopolist selling
a single object, often an incorrect supposition. Therefore, I only assume that a seller's reserve price
is monotonic in the quality of the item. Moreover, I will not assume anything about the separability
or additivity of the unobserved component.
This section is divided into two parts. The rst develops and shows identication of a more
general model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The second introduces a technique to reduce
dimensionality and this is the model on which the empirical work is built.
3.1 Identication of the General Model
To introduce notation, let bidders be indexed by i and auctions by t = 1;:::;T. In the auctions
considered here, one indivisible good is auctioned o to a bidder from a collection of n 2 fn;:::;ng
bidders. Let the number of bidders in an auction t be given by Nt, making the number of com-
petitors faced by bidder i in auction t equal to Nt   1. In the empirical section I consider used car
auctions. For each car there are some observed characteristics Zt 2 <K and an unobserved (to the
econometrician) characteristic Ut 2 <.7 Both the seller and the bidders observe both Zt and Ut,
even though the econometrician only observes Zt. Let U be distributed according to the distribution
function FU. At each auction upon observing the cars' characteristics Z and the realization of U,
bidders receive independent and private signals S, which could be considered their type, which is
6Finally, although the strategy is not employed in the paper, the work of Khan (2001) can be adapted so one can
include a detailed data set in the semi-nonparametric estimation of a nonlinear function's non-additive error term
by using a linear index and the techniques of maximum rank correlation estimation to develop a dierent estimation
technique. There are obvious restrictions, however, in mandating that items' covariates should enter a bidding or
reserve price function through a linear index which may be especially unattractive if one doesn't believe that these
covariates form an index of quality.
7The assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is single valued is a restriction that will be maintained throughout
the empirical portion of the paper. However, below I show how in principle we could relax this assumption and still
identify the model should the necessary data be available.
7distributed according to the function FS.8 I am assuming, therefore, that bidders are symmetric in
their value distribution. Each bidder has some value for the object Vi and I assume that the random
variables (S1;:::;Sn;V1;:::;Vn) are aliated, where this is loosely taken to mean that if one of these
variables takes on a higher value, then there is a greater probability that other variables also assume
a higher value.9 Moreover, signals are informative in that, conditional on any realizations of his
competitors signals, the expectation of a bidder's value is assumed to be increasing in his signal.
For now, consider the case when bidders have independent private values (IPV) so that:
E[VijS1 = S1;:::;Sn = sn] = E[VijSi = si] = si (1)
and let the auction format be any one in which bidders submit bid B according to some function
B = (Z;U;S).
Now, suppose that sellers set reserve prices R according to R = m(Z;U) where I further assume:
Assumption S1 For all values z of Z, m(Z;U) is strictly increasing in U.
Therefore, I am assuming that the function m() does not vary across sellers. This is a restriction
that could be relaxed should the data set contain the necessary information about the sellers or
contemporaneous auctions to allow it.
It is important to note that I am not requiring sellers to set reserve prices optimally. I assume
that, ceteris paribus, a higher realization of the unobserved heterogeneity leads the seller to set a
higher reserve price. This is simply a restriction on the function m() which is intuitively appeal-
ing and particularly inoensive when we think of the unobserved heterogeneity as some index of
unobserved quality.10 However, as the following proposition shows, even when we do assume that
sellers set their reserve price optimally, Assumption S1 holds for a large class of bidder value dis-
tributions.11 From the literature on optimal auctions (Bulow and Roberts (1989)) we the optimal
8Throughout the paper the dependence of this distribution on Z and U is suppressed for notational convenience.
9The formal denition of aliation is given: random variables W are aliated if their joint distribution fW is such
that for any w1 and w2, fW(w1 _ w2)fW(w1 ^ w2)  fW(w1)fW(w2) where _ denotes the component-wise maximum
and ^ denotes the component-wise minimum.
10One concern with this assumption is based on heterogenous costs of selling the cars elsewhere across sellers. The
reserve prices set by the sellers reect, at least in part, their outside value of retaining the car in the event that the
car doesn't sell. If two sellers of similar cars have diering outside options, for example due to dierences in their
respective costs of selling the cars elsewhere, then it is possible that reserve prices are not increasing in U. This may
happen if the owner of the car with a lower value of unobserved heterogeneity has a lower cost of selling the car
elsewhere than does the seller of the car with the higher value of U. This possibility is ignored given the empirical
application. One reason is that no information about individual sellers is available. I also justify the lack of a seller's
private information impacting reserve prices below.




fY (t) for all t. It
should be noted that a stronger requirement that distributions of values for higher realizations of U maintain a hazard
rate dominance over those for lower realizations of U, which is implied by aliation, and immediately delivers the
result in Proposition 1, is itself not very restrictive. First, it is satised for many of the distributions often used
to parameterize bidder values when those distributions' parameters are specied as monotonic functions of U. This
can be seen in one example from specifying the distribution of values to be Weibull with parameters that depend






, for v > 0, where k > 0, () > 0, where 
0() > 0. It can be
shown that the mean of values when U = u2 relative to the mean when U = u1 is given by
(u2)
(u1) is greater than 1
when u2 > u1, a sensible result. More to the point however, the inverse hazard ratio is given by
1
kU kvk 1 which
8reserve price, assuming that FV is strictly increasing and continuously dierentiable, is given by:
b  = argsup2[v;v](;v0;FV )
= argsup2[v;v] [   v0][1   FV ()] (2)
Intuitively, equation 2 says that the optimal reserve price is one that maximizes the prots of a
monopolist facing a demand curve described by 1  FV () and with \marginal cost" given by v0. If
v0 is the opportunity cost of not selling the car at the auction, we can think of v0 as the value to
the seller of keeping the car if it failed to sell at auction. The optimal reserve price is given:




Proposition 1. Let the cumulative distribution of bidder values V , conditional on the realization
of unobserved heterogeneity, be G  F(jU), with associated density g, where the dependence on U
is noted, and let the seller have a valuation for the object equal to v0. Denote r(v0;G;U) as the
optimal reserve price set by such a seller facing bidders characterized by value distribution G and
a realization of unobserved heterogeneity U. If V and U are aliated and c(t;U) = t  
1 G(tjU)
g(tjU) is
increasing in t for all U, then 8 u1 < u2, r(v0;G;u1) < r(v0;G;u2).
Note that the regularity condition on the function c(t;U) is the familiar one introduced in
Myerson (1981).
Despite the result of Proposition 1, I will continue to allow sellers not to set the optimal reserve
price. Based on the results of the next proposition I will argue that if we make normalization as-
sumptions on the functions () and m() and some conditional independence assumptions regarding
the distributions of U and S, we can identify the distributions of both unobserved heterogeneity
and bidder signals without assuming independence between S and U. The results build on the work
of Matzkin (2003). Suppose that we decompose observable characteristics into two sets of variables:
Z = (Z0;Z1).
Proposition 2. Let Assumption S1 hold and assume (i) 9 z1 such that 8 U and 8 z0, m(z0;z1;u) =
u and (ii) U is independent of Z1 conditional on Z0. Then FSj(Z;U)() is identied from observations
of the transaction price and the reserve price in rst and second price auctions.
Therefore, using only data on reserve prices and winning bids, the distribution of bidders' private
values, conditional on observable auction covariates and the realization of unobserved heterogeneity,
is identied.12 The proof of identication also suggests a two step estimation procedure whereby the
is increasing in U, delivering hazard rate stochastic dominance. Second, many of the properties that seem sensible
when incorporating unobserved heterogeneity are maintained under the assumption of hazard rate dominance. For
example, if bidder values are denoted by the random variable V
1 when the unobserved heterogeneity is u1 and V
2
when it is u2 and u1 < u2, so we assume that V
1 is hazard rate dominated by V
2, then (i) E[V
1] < E[V
2] and (ii)
the average transaction prices will be greater, in 1st price, 2nd price, Dutch and English auctions when U = u2.
12One should note that the normalization required in the proposition is one that is implicitly assumed in many
functional forms. For example, if we let Z = Z1, both R = ZU and R = Z + U satisfy the restriction when z = 0.
9econometrician rst estimates the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and the reserve price
function m(). This allows him to \back out" the realization of the random variable U in each
auction since with m() known, for any R and Z, there is a unique solution to R = m(Z;U). Then
he can estimate the distribution of S conditional on some auction covariates and the realization of
U using the distribution of winning bids for those auction covariates and the realization of U. To
illustrate this procedure, I perform a Monte Carlo study in the appendix.13
3.2 Dimension Reduction: a Common Single Index
While the two step estimation procedure outlined above is quite general, it may be dicult to apply
this nonparametric routine when there are many observable dimensions along which objects dier.
Therefore, I wish to introduce a procedure which is similar in spirit but allows us to incorporate a
high dimensional Z. Thus, in this section I simplify the estimation procedure by noting that we can
combine the covariates of the item into an index and this index will aect both the reserve price set
by the sellers and the bids placed by the bidders. In this section, I rst seek to convey the idea by
assuming that the reserve price and the bidding functions will only be aected by the single index.
I then highlight the restrictions and exibility of this modeling assumption. After this I enrich the
model by allowing other covariates outside of the single index to aect reserve prices and bidding.
To begin, assume that sellers set their reserve price according to the following function:
R = m(h(Z;U)) (4)
where m() is strictly monotonic. Bidders bid according to:
B = (h(Z;U);S) (5)
where () is monotonic and where, just to emphasize, () and m() are entirely dierent functions.14
I will address the restrictions placed on seller and bidder behavior in the context of the empirical
portion of the paper: used car auctions (the data for which will be introduced in Section 4). The
rst assumption to note is that the same aggregator h(Z;U) appears in both functions. This places
very little restriction on the behavior of bidders and sellers as the following thought experiment will
13One extension of the model is to consider settings with multi-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. It seems as
though the previous identication result can be generalized to this setting, but this is only speculative. Suppose, for
example, that the signal U 2 <
L1
;L
1 > 1: What one could require is that there exist as many policy variables (denoted
by what is now a vector R) as there are dimensions of U, L





Rl, there exist functions Rl = ml(Z;Ul) which are monotonic in Ul. Then if we allow the bids to depend on the entire
vector U, we can simply perform the \rst part" of the above proof L
1 times to each of the functions m() in order
to uncover all of the realizations of unobserved heterogeneity. Still, this remains to be shown. One setting where we
might want to consider such a model is eBay, where sellers can choose not only reserve prices, but also auction length,
whether or not to display pictures of the item, whether or not to have the object insured, shipping charges, etc.
14Without loss of generality, since both m() and () are monotonic, we could assume that R = h(Z;U). However,
in order to be explicit and maintain notational consistency, I will not relax this assumption now.
10reveal. Consider two cars with characteristics (Z1;U1) and (Z2;U2) such that:
Z1 > Z2; U2 > U1; h(Z1;U1) = h(Z2;U2)
Then it must be the case that R1 = R2 and that for a bidder with S, B1 = B2. Moreover, any
movement within the index must move both the bids and the reserve prices, though certainly not
by the same amount.15
Another assumption is that bidder and seller characteristics do not enter either the reserve
pricing or bidding functions. To the extent that there may be strategic interactions among bidders
based on repeated interaction or varying levels of competition in their home markets, one might
think that these covariates should enter the bidding function. However, since the data come from
an English auction where bidders bid their values truthfully, I will not need to consider the way that
bidders incorporate information about the distribution of bidder specic covariates into the model.
Moreover, since bidder covariates don't aect bidding behavior, the sellers' reserve pricing should
also remain unaected by these characteristics. We can further support the claim that bidders don't
take into account the observable dierences in their competitors since, as will be explained more
fully below, they cannot discern which of their potential competitors is currently bidding against
them. The assumption that a seller's covariates don't enter the reserve pricing function is also a
restriction. As was mentioned above, heterogenous costs of selling the car elsewhere across the
seller population may violate the underlying assumption that reserve prices are increasing in U.
Unfortunately, the data needed to control for such dierences is not available in the application
below, but should it be in other contexts then these heterogeneous costs could, in principle, be
controlled for. I do justify that there is no private signal impacting reserve prices in Section 4.2.
However, despite these explanations for excluding bidder and seller covariates from impacting the
reserve pricing and bidding equations, the model still could incorporate characteristics of the seller
or bidders that are observable to each auction participant. It can do so through the unobserved
heterogeneity, if we believe that this information can be compiled through such a uni-dimensional
statistic.
Finally, the assumption that both m() and () incorporate Z and U through h() is a restriction.
For instance, we might want to let B = (Z;U;S). This is less restrictive, but since Z and U
are likely to be quality measures, compiling them through h() seems fairly innocuous. Another
complaint about the function h() might be that it should vary across types of sellers and bidders
if there is horizontal dierentiation in automobile dealerships. This is plausible since even though
much of the data are quality measures, which would vertically dierentiate cars, there might be a
concern that certain bidders, who are automobile dealers, specialize in certain types of cars, and
therefore some kind of random coecients model would be more appropriate. Unfortunately, I
cannot identify dierent types of bidders in my data, so for the time being I will proceed with
15Finally, if we require R to be optimal for the seller, although not requiring it to be the optimal reserve price
dened in Equation 3, then it cannot be the case that h() is not the same function for the seller and the bidders.
Consider R1 set in response to (Z1;U1). If a new car with characteristics (Z2;U2) alters bidding behavior but not
seller behavior since they may have dierent h() functions, then R1 could not have been optimal in the rst place.
11keeping h().16
With the assumptions addressed, I now highlight the exibility of this specication. Focusing on
the sellers, I do not assume they set reserve prices optimally. I only assume that they are monotonic
in the quality of the item. I also do not specify the form of competition by the sellers, though I
refrain from allowing other items' characteristics to enter the reserve pricing function, except when
\market conditions" are captured by U. I simply assume that the sellers face buyers whose values
are increasing in the quality of the item for sale. For bidders, I have left the bidding behavior,
and even the auction format itself, unspecied. Finally, I have said nothing so far that restricts
correlation between any of the signals or between any signal and the covariates.
The payo of this general specication is that should our ultimate goal be to recover an estimate
of FS, as is often the case in empirical auction work, the monotonicity of m() permits the following:
h(Z;U) = m 1(R) (6)
Then, by inserting equation 6 into equation 5 we can rewrite the bidder equation as:
B = (m 1(R);S) (7)
Thus, we have eliminated the unobserved heterogeneity from the bidder function and now we can
estimate the distribution of bidder values, FS.
However, suppose we now wish to modify our analysis by allowing:
R = m(h(Z;U); ~ Z) (8)
B = (h(Z;U); ~ Z;S) (9)
where ~ Z 2 RL;L < K is potentially some subvector of Z. In words, we are allowing something
beyond the function h() and a bidder's signal to determine his bid, and therefore the reserve price
selected by the seller. Let 
 = < x <L x <. Then, for all (h; ~ Z;R) 2 
 the monotonicity of m()
implies that there exists a unique, continuously dierentiable function ' : <LX < ! < such that
'(R; ~ Z) = h(Z;U) and
B = ('(R; ~ Z); ~ Z;S) (10)
Again, the unobserved heterogeneity is \purged" from the bidding function.17




















and h() is not a function of S.
17Following the idea in footnote 13, the process might be able to be generalized to include multidimensional un-
observed heterogeneity. What I require is that there are L
1 signals which are distributed jointly independent, there
exist enough seller choice variables (> L
1) which are observable and that the following holds:
Rl = ml(hl(Zl;Ul); ~ Z);i = 1;:::;L
1 (11)
B = (h1(Z1;U1);h2(Z2;U2);:::;hL1(ZL1;UL1); ~ Z;S) (12)
because I can apply the above inversion L
1 times, each time generating a new 'l(), each of which can be used to
12Before moving onto estimation, I now describe the data.
4 Data Description
In this section I introduce the data, show how it supports the contention that both bidders and
sellers observe what the econometrician does not and justify the modeling assumptions made above
in the empirical context.
The data in this paper come from used car auctions in South Korea from late 2001 through
2002. Auctions have been utilized to sell cars for at least 60 years and their use continues to grow
rapidly. Automobile auctions are worth examining due to their size and importance to the overall
automobile market, their relevance to the study of unobserved heterogeneity and their relationship
to a host of interesting policy questions.
The National Automobile Auction Association (according to the NAAA 2007 survey) estimates
that over 9.5 million cars, valued at nearly $89 billion, were sold by auctions in the U.S. in 2007,
a 2.2% increase over 2006 and a 5% increase over 2005. In wholesale used car sales, where dealers
purchase inventory to ll their lots, auctions are still frequently used. The National Association
of Automobile Dealers estimates that new and used car dealers acquired 32% of their used car
inventory via auctions, up from less than 6% in 1982 (see Taylor (2007) and Kontos (2006) for more
details).
Aside from automobile auctions' size and scope, the analysis of such auctions presents a potential
textbook case for investigating the problem of unobserved heterogeneity to the analyst and/or
econometrician. It is likely that buyers and sellers present at the auction are able to observe aspects
of the cars which aect their values and thus their bids and reserve prices, yet cannot be observed
in even a rather extensive data set provided to the analyst. Examples of such unobserved qualities
could be such things as rust, dents or tire quality, just to name a few. Therefore, it is likely that
should the econometrician fail to account for such unobserved heterogeneity, his results from a host
counterfactual experiments would be incorrect.18
4.1 Summary of Data
In this subsection I introduce the data and present some summary statistics. I then use the data to
support the hypothesis that bidders and sellers observe and respond to unobservable characteristics
of each car.
The used car auctions took place on a weekly basis at a particular auction house in Suwon,
South Korea which is approximately an hour outside of Seoul by car, between October 10th, 2001
and November 27th, 2002. At this wholesale used car auction, both dealers and individuals may sell
substitute into equation 12 for hl(). This is only speculation and I leave a full proof of the idea, which is beyond the
scope of this paper, to future work.
18Though outside the scope of this paper, we might be particularly concerned with the South Korean automobile
market since on June 30th, 2007 the U.S. and South Korea signed a free trade agreement whereby South Korea agreed
to remove its 8% tari on U.S. made passenger vehicles and its 10% tari on pickup trucks which is meaningful to
U.S. producers who currently claim only a miniscule portion of the Korean auto market.
13cars but only dealers registered with the auction house may bid. During the 57 weeks covered, there
were over 380 members registered with the auction house and this group was stable over the time
period. Unlike the U.S., where it is common for dealers to sell both new and used cars, the dealers
in this data set specialize in used cars only and according to sources these dealers are perceived to
be sellers of high quality used cars.19 Also, car dealers in South Korea tend to be much smaller than
their counterparts in the U.S. The auction house was set up by an aliate of Daewoo and its main
competitor was a similar, but much smaller, auction house (set up by Hyundai) an hour away. The
auction house charges the seller $50 for any car it auctions regardless of whether it sells and, in the
event of sale, collects 2.2% of the transaction price from both the buyer and seller. The individual
seller of the car has full control over the reserve price he sets, though in practice the auction house
almost always provides guidance on this matter. Registered members receive information about cars
that are going to be auctioned three days ahead of time. The information contains a description
of the cars including make, model, mileage, age, etc. The cars have reserve prices, but these are
not revealed to the buyers. If a dealer wishes to place a bid, he must send an agent to the auction
house to be present at the time of the auction.20
On auction day, bidders show up three or more hours before the auction to inspect all of the
automobiles being auctioned that day. When the auction begins, all bidders sit at tables in front
of the car being auctioned. A screen at the front of the room displays the current bid for the car.
The auction format used is a variant on the classic English button auction originally described in
Cassady (1967) and analyzed in Milgrom and Weber (1982).21 The price of the item being auctioned
rises continuously and in order to remain in the auction a bidder must keep his nger on a button
beneath his table in front of him. Reentry of bidders is allowed which simplies the strategies of
the bidders since they do not need to condition on which bidders are currently \in" or \out" of
the auction. The price for the car being auctioned rises in $30 increments every three seconds
provided that at least two bidders have their buttons depressed. Bidders cannot observe when their
competitors have dropped out of the auction.22 A bidder wins if he is the last bidder with his nger
on the button and he pays the current bid at this moment. The winning bidder is responsible for
19This is in contrast to other automobile markets sometimes considered. See for example Adams, Einav, and Levin
(2007).
20An interesting practice by the auction house is that it permits a dealer to send multiple agents, each of whom
can place separate bids on a particular car. This allowance has an ambiguous aect on transaction prices since to
the extent that these cars have common value elements in them, a dealer which follows this strategy may hurt itself
because the increase in perceived competition among other dealers due to this dealer sending multiple bidders might
lead to an increase in the transaction price. On the other hand, if bidders become more afraid of the winners curse,
they may bid less aggressively and thus lower the transaction price. Pinkse and Tan (2005) also provide a model
where the winning bid does not necessarily increase in the number of bidders for reasons separate from the winner's
curse, though they study rst price auctions.
21The model of bidding behavior relies heavily on the auction operating as does the classic button auction. In the
majority of empirical work with English auctions, researchers assume that the auction model really does follow the
button procedure, even when this is far from the truth. For example, the auction may actually function as an open
outcry auction. A benet of the data in this paper is that it is one of the very few examples we have where the data
generating process is literally a button auction. However, were it not the case, preventing us from relying on the
equilibrium mapping between bids and unobserved demand, we could employ the now well known methodology of
Haile and Tamer (2003).
22See Kim and Lee (2006) for additional descriptions of the auction house.
14transporting the automobile osite.
During the period of study there were 28,334 passenger cars auctioned. The types of car auc-
tioned were sedans, three and ve door hatchbacks, jeeps, small minivans, minibuses, small trucks
and motorbikes.23 In an eort to maintain a homogenous data set, the sample I analyze consists
of over 8,500 sedans made by Hyundai, Daewoo (which was acquired by GM in 2001) and Kia
(which was acquired by Hyundai in 1998) that had been previously owned for \regular" individual
purposes, as opposed to being part of government or rental company eets. Some summary statis-
tics for the cars appear in Table 1. Importantly, in terms of bids, I only observe the transaction
price (also referred to in the paper as the winning bid) and the identity of the winner and the
second highest bidder. All variables are measured at the time of auction. Here AGE is the number
of months since the car was originally manufactured, MILEAGE is the reading on the odometer
in 100,000s of kilometers, AUTOMATIC is a dummy variable coding for whether the car has an
automatic transmission (=1) and PASSENGERS is a dummy variable coding for whether the car
can seat ve (=1) or four passengers. I also have data on the model and colors of the car, though
those statistics are not summarized in the table. The average car is a little under 6.5 years old,
with around 100,000 kms (approximately 62,000 miles). Approximately two thirds of the cars have
an automatic transmission and almost all hold ve passengers. Cars tend to sell for a little under
$3,000. On average more than ve bidders place bids on a car, and (not shown) over four place bids
once the price has passed the reserve price. A person is counted as a bidder if they ever have their
button depressed once the price has begun to rise.
Table 2 shows characteristics of the bidders. There are approximately 145 cars of the type
I consider sold at each auction. There are 385 dierent bidders in the data and conditional on
showing up, on average they win approximately 2 auctions per day and around 20 auctions of this
type of car during the entire time I consider. There are some buyers who win much more than
this, including 10 that win over 100 cars. In an eort to measure the overall bidding activity of the
members, not just their winnings, I can (extremely) conservatively estimate how many bids they
place by looking at all of the times the bidder is one of the two top bidders since this is all that I
observe in the data. This measure shows that bidders are active during at least 17% of the days on
average, though 12 are active on at least 90% of the days. Finally, I also have data on an imprecise
measure of each bidder's location. I know in which of the 13 South Korean provinces each rm is
located, and therefore, I can measure the distance from the centroid of each province to the auction
house.
Figure 1 plots the winning bid and reserve price for similar cars (ve passenger Hyundais with
automatic transmissions) on a randomly chosen day, January 30th, 2002. As can be seen, there is
evidence that sellers and bidders are observing the same information, which is unobserved by the
econometrician, and responding to it in ways which are observable in the data.
To get a better feel for the factors aecting bids and the relationship between winning bids and
reserve prices, tentatively explored in Figure 1, I begin with some basic analysis of price determinants
23Unlike the U.S., SUVs were not prevalent in South Korea at this time.
15for the automobiles. The results appear in Table 3. The estimated impacts of the cars' attributes
are robust to dierent specications. The price tends to fall by 3% for each additional month of
its life. Its mileage also has a large impact on value, though not quite as pronounced since for
each 100,000 kms (62,000 miles) drops the price by around 3%. There is a sharp dierence in
value between automatic and standard transmissions, with automatics commanding an almost 40%
premium even after controlling for a car's make and model. Though it is not as meaningful since
almost all cars hold the same number of passengers, cars that only hold four passengers sell for
substantially less than those that hold ve. Finally, and quite surprisingly, the distance of the
winning bidder's headquarters from the auction site has a positive, but only marginally signicant,
and even less in the \economic" sense of the word, eect on his bid (and this does not seem to vary
by adding higher powers of distance).
The last column of Table 3 includes the log of the reserve price as a covariate in an attempt to
assess the comovement of it and the winning bid controlling for all of the other likely determinants
of price. The winning bid and reserve price are highly correlated. In addition, there are other
interesting things to note. First, all of the previously explored variables remain signicant, though
the magnitude of many of their impacts are lowered suggesting that the reserve price is not just
some mechanical function of a car's characteristics. Second, the overall t of the model jumps from,
85%, already a high number, with the covariates now explaining almost 97% of the variation in
price. All of the evidence from the last column suggests that the reserve price has great ability to
control for unobserved variation in an item's \quality".
Table 4 explores the determinants of reserve prices. The results provide evidence that the
factors aecting bidder values also aect reserve prices in a similar direction and by a comparable
magnitude. This suggests that bidder and seller behavior in response to the observable qualities
of the car are similar and thus lends support to the hypothesis that they may be similarly aligned
over what is not observed by the econometrician.
Finally, to get a sense that the results in the rst plot in Figure 1 weren't driven by dierences
in the mileage and age of cars, I also plot the residuals from regressions of the log of the winning
bid and log of the reserve price on the observable characteristics of the cars. The results for the
randomly chosen day used above are plotted in in the top right panel of Figure 1. The comovement
evident in the plot is highly suggestive of the overlapping information of the seller and the bidder
to which the economist is not privy. Also, not reported elsewhere, the correlation of these residuals
is 0.9002 compared to a correlation of 0.9815 of the raw data.
The empirical work in the paper relies on auctions for which I have the winning bid conditional
on the reserve price being met. From this I will rely on comovement between the winning bid and
the reserve price to help control for the unobserved heterogeneity. However, we would want to see if
this is the case for auctions that fail to meet the reserve price. For these auctions, it should also be
the case that higher reserve prices tend to be associated with higher maximum, though ultimately
failing, bids since there is still likely to be some unobserved characteristic that aecting bidders'
bids and sellers' reserve prices. To check this I was able to obtain data on the highest bid placed
16for an object that did not sell (because the reserve price was not met) for a smaller time period:
October 10th, 2001 to December 27th, 2001. During this time, 243 of the 2,142 cars auctioned, or
11.3%, failed to sell.24 The bottom row of Figure 1 provides evidence that sellers and bidders are
observing and responding to similar movement in what the econometrician does not observe. The
bottom left gure is a plot of the reserve price and highest bid, in logs, for all auctions of Hyundai's
with an automatic transmission during this time period. It is evident that the highest bid and
reserve price are strongly correlated, just as these prices moved together in the top row of Figure 1.
For external validity, we also might wonder if there is something dierent about the cars that
do not sell. To test this, I estimated a logit model of whether the car failed to sell as a function
of the cars' characteristics and also the time of year. The results appear in Table ?? and will be
referred to again in Section 4.2. The only characteristic that seems to matter is that older cars are
more likely to fail to sell.
We can also see that the auctions that fail respond in a fairly similar manner to auction covariates
as did the items that sold. This is borne out in Table 5 for both (logs of) highest bid and average
bid. Though many of the impacts' signicance are dampened, there is still a great deal of correlation
between these bid statistics and the reserve price, as was the case in the regressions conditioning
on a successful sale. Also, in the spirit of the top right panel in Figure 1, I plot the residuals from
regressions of the highest bids and reserve prices on car characteristics for cars that failed to sell in
the last plot in Figure 1. The correlation in these residuals is 0.9752 compared with a correlation
of 0.9970 of the raw data. The results continue to support the similar possession of, and response
to, information by bidders and sellers which is not available to the econometrician.25
4.2 Does the Model Fit the Data?
Before moving on to the estimation, it remains to be shown that the data t the model and
its assumptions described so far. In order to validate the model, I will address whether I can
support the assumptions that (i) conditional on Z and U that the bidders at the used car auctions
have independent private values, (ii) the results shown in Figure 1 aren't a mechanical result, (iii)
the unobserved heterogeneity aects both the reserve price and the bids, (iv) we can utilize the
single index model (v) bidders have a unit demand and (vi) sellers use the same reserve price
setting function m(). While there may be other concerns about the model, the verication of these
assumptions should greatly strengthen the condence in the estimation results below.
There are two justications for assuming independent private values (IPV) among the bidders
conditional on a car's characteristics. The rst justication notes that while each bidder (all of whom
are dealers) is interested in reselling the car should they win, each dealer has its own inventory, its
24The reserve price was binding in approximately 7% of these auctions. I am able to incorporate these auctions by
using the second highest bid despite the fact it was less than the reserve price.
25Since the model relies on all bidders observing what the econometrician does not, we can also see if there is
comovement between the second highest bid and the reserve price. Using the same diagnostic as above by regressing
the reserve price and the second highest bid on the observables, we nd a correlation in the observables of 0.8195
compared with a correlation of 0.98 in the raw data. This lends support to the underlying assumption of all bidders
and sellers observing what the econometrician does not.
17own transportation cost and may cater to idiosyncratic local demands,26 thereby ruling out a pure
common value component of the cars. The second justication is that in these auctions there is no
reason to think that one bidder has a dierent information set about the car being auctioned than
any other bidder.27 As is well known, the assumption of IPV does not rule out correlation in bidders'
information or their values being commonly aected by characteristics of the item, provided that
bidders do not have private information about the characteristics. So, the assumption that bidders
all observe what the econometrician does not, and that this component aects their valuations,
does not violate the assumption of IPV since bidders do not have private (from the other bidders)
information about what the econometrician does not observe, in the same way they do not have
private information about observed auction heterogeneity. This is in contrast to a market like eBay
motors where buyers dier on many dimensions which are correlated with their information sets
about the auctioned item. For example, Lewis (2007) notes that a common value model is more
appropriate for eBay motors because bidders who live in close proximity to the automobile being
auctioned may be better able to inspect the car themselves than distant bidders.
Figure 1 attempts to replicate the motivating picture from Laont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995).
However, this replication may have been a mechanical result if the winning bidder tended to be the
only bidder bidding above the reserve price. With a bid increment this would have guaranteed that
the winning bid and the reserve price moved in lockstep. However, this is not the case because while
I do not see any bids other than the winning bid, I do know the number of dierent bidders bidding
on each car and how many were above the reserve price. On average just under ve bidders bid on
each car and approximately four bid above the reserve price. In fact, I constructed the gure so
that no auction in the gure received less than two bids above the reserve price. Therefore, we can
be condent that the comovement in winning bids and reserve prices isn't mechanically derived.
The identication and estimation of the model rely on the fact that there is nothing that enters
the reserve price equation that does not enter the bidding function. This rules out a seller's private
signal or the unobserved heterogeneity aecting only the seller's resale opportunities (or in general
his outside option) should he not be able to sell the item at the auction. In regards to the private
signal entering the reserve pricing function, as mentioned above, the auction house usually sets the
reserve price. This means that it is not the seller who is setting it, and thus it is less likely that there
is a private signal entering this function which varies from car to car. In terms of the unobserved
heterogeneity entering the reserve pricing function, but not the bidding function, one could imagine,
for example, that the seller is an individual looking to acquire a new car once he sells his current
one. If the seller derived more utility from driving a car with less dents, say, than a similar one with
more dents, then it is conceivable that the seller would wish to set a higher reserve price for a car
with less dents although the bidders might not value the car any dierently from one with less dents.
This seems highly implausible since the bidders in these auctions are themselves used car dealers
26In fact, bidders are often sent by a downstream purchaser to bid for a certain automobile on the downstream
purchaser's behalf, which lends further support to the assumption of independent private values over aliated private
values made in Section 5.
27This auction house was viewed as selling \high quality" used cars so that issues involving \Lemons" and other
bidders potentially having information pertinent to one anothers' values may not be as relevant.
18concerned with selling the car to buyers who may have preferences similar to the current owner of
the car. Nevertheless, we can test the hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity only aects
reserve prices, and not bidder values, (or more generally that there is something in which reserve
prices are increasing but bids are not) by looking at whether the probability of a failed sale due to
a lack of bids above the reserve price increases in the reserve price. From the logit model of failure
described above, I nd that the reserve price is not a statistically, or economically28, signicant
determinant of failure to sell. This lends strong support to the assumption that the unobserved
automobile heterogeneity aects both bids and reserve prices.
Another possibility is that sellers have private information about the cars that bidders value.
This is similar to the model studied in Lewis (2007). How should the seller's private information
aect the seller's reserve price? Cai, Riley, and Ye (2007) develop a model where bidders value the
seller's private information and it is incentive compatible for sellers to use their reserve price as a
signal of this information: the separating equilibrium is for sellers with higher realizations of " to
set higher reserve prices. There is a testable implication of this model in the data. Cai, Riley, and
Ye (2007) show that when reserve prices can be used as signals that the optimal reserve price is
increasing in the number of bidders. Therefore, we can test whether this holds in the data. When
we regress the log of reserve prices on automobile's characteristics and the number of bidders there
is a positive but insignicant relationship between the number of bidders and the reserve price
(p-value of 0.44). This, along with the previous evidence that there is not a private signal which
aects reserve prices but not bids, provides support for modeling reserve prices as functions of Z
and U alone.
The assumption of a single index, as applied in equation 9, would be violated if after controlling
for variation in bids by a exible function of reserve prices, the unexplained variation in bids then
could be explained by movement in the observables which ought to have aected reserve prices.
To grasp this violation, consider a seller who has the luxury of selling one of two cars. The cars
have quite dierent characteristics, all of which he would observe, but the value of h(), which to
him is a known function, is the same for each car. The assumptions about the forms of () and
m() guarantee that he should be indierent between selling these two cars. However, if he knew
that bidders would still tend to bid more for one of the cars due to the dierence in characteristics,
then he would not be indierent between the cars and thus our assumptions about the degree to
which variations in cars could be accounted for by this single index h() are wrong.29 This thought
experiment motivates the following test. Calculate the Goodness of t from the following regression:
B = g(R) + 1 (13)
where B is the winning bid and g() is some nonparametric function of reserve prices R. Then, run
28As the reserve price increases from from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the probability of failure
increases approximately 1 percentage point.
29It does not mean that the assumption of a single index is wrong, but rather that we hadn't specied a rich enough
single index to satisfy the assumptions about bidder and seller behavior.
19the following regression:
B = g(R) + Z + 2 (14)
where Z is the observable auction covariates, and compare the overall t of the model to that
without the inclusion of Z. To perform the test I let g() be a fth order polynomial in the reserve
price. The R2 of the rst regression is 0.9675. However, the R2 of the second regression is 0.9695.
This test provides highly supportive evidence that the assumption of a single index in the functions
m() and () is valid since after controlling for reserve prices in a exible way, the unexplained
variation in winning bids is not explained by the automobile's characteristics.30
Also, I assume that bidders have unit demands. This is a questionable assumption, though
one that is very common in empirical auction work due to its simplifying implications. To justify
making the assumption in my data, I note that almost 75% of the time that a bidder wins a car, he
wins less than three cars that day. Moreover, among those days on which a bidder wins two cars,
over half the time those cars are of dierent makes, and when they are of the same make, around
2/3 of the time the car is of dierent models. This means that the majority of the time the cars
being purchased are meeting unique demands of the buyers. There is also evidence of unit demands
in Table ?? since the likelihood of failure is increasing in the order in which the vehicle is auctioned
within any given day.31
Finally, I have assumed throughout that all sellers use the same reserve pricing function m().
This is potentially problematic since individual sellers are the ones bringing the automobiles to be
sold. However, the majority of the time the auction house provides guidance on how to set the
reserve price of the car. To the extent that the auction house is an \expert" on the auction market,
it then serves as a mechanism for translating car characteristics into reserve prices. Moreover, as
the analysis will bear out, it appears that the reserve prices are moving in consistent ways across
vehicles despite the fact that the identity of the sellers is changing.
Having built support for the validity of the model's assumptions, I now turn to estimating the
distribution of bidder values and evaluating unobserved heterogeneity's impact on policy questions
of interest.
5 Estimation
In this section I report the results from nonparametrically estimating the distribution of bidder
values based on the single index modeling specication that results in the bidding function in
equation 10. I also explore how ignoring unobserved heterogeneity matters in our counterfactual
30However, an F-test of  = 0 produces a test statistic of 12.81 thus rejecting the coecients all jointly being zero.
Still, I will rely on the extremely small increase in the R
2 as support for the single index assumption.
31Although not shown here, I attempted to test whether the cars were ordered according to some characteristic by
regressing the auction order within a day on the car's characteristics for the period of time I have both the failed
and successful sales, and it does not seem that there is any statistically signicant relationship between when a car
is auctioned and its characteristics. One caveat is that Daewoo automobiles seem to be auctioned o rst, but this
is not likely to be a problem since most dealers purchase two or less cars per day and demands for cars of dierent
makes are likely to be distinct.
20experiments. I model the automobiles as being sold through a symmetric IPV English Button
auction. It is well known that in these auction potential buyers bid their values.
To begin, I focus on certain kinds of cars with characteristics Z. Then, within this collection
of cars, I further segment by reserve price. I wish to estimate the distribution of bidder values for
these cars at each reserve price, say R. In order to do so I need to specify the number of potential
bidders for this car. This is because the winning bid is the second highest among N bidders from
the true distribution of values. Below, I outline how I specify the number of potential bidders,
but for now, suppose we know that this is N. Then, I can relate the distribution of winning bids
for these auctions to the distribution of values for these cars according to the following mapping.
Let v(i:N) be the ith highest of N draws from FV and denote its distribution by FV(i:N). From the
bidding equilibrium above, we know that if FWjN is the distribution of winning bids across auctions
with N potential bidders, then FWjN = FV2:N. Furthermore we know that (see Athey and Haile
(2002) and more generally Arnold, Balakrishnan, and Nagaraja (1992).)
FV(i:N)(v) =
N!
(N   i)!(i   1)!
Z FV (v)
0
uN i(1   u)i 1du (15)
By observing the winning bid we are actually observing v(2:N) and 15 allows us to nonparametrically
map a distribution of winning bids to FV (v).
The estimation technique is a two step procedure. First FV(2:N)(v) must be obtained from FW(v).
No longer suppressing notation, I use the nonparametric kernel estimator for this distribution from
Nadaraya (1964) which is given by:
b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v) =
PT
t=1 ~ k1(v Wt
 )k2( ~ z  ~ Zt
 )
PT
t=1 k2( ~ z  ~ Zt
 )
where  is the bandwidth, k1 : < ! < and k2 : <L ! < are some kernel functions and ~ k1 =
R u
1 k1(s)ds.
Matzkin (2003) shows that under certain regularity conditions, b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v) is asymptotically
normal with mean FWj ~ Z=~ z(v) and variance VFW. The next proposition derives the asymptotic
distribution of the estimator for the distribution of values, b FV j ~ Z=~ z(v).
Proposition 3. Let the number of potential bidders in T auctions be a constant N. Let FV j ~ Z=~ z(v)












N2(N   1)2FV j ~ Z=~ z(v)2(N 1)(1   FV j ~ Z=~ z(v))2
To test hypotheses, we need to replace VFW and VFV with consistent estimators, which under
the assumptions of Proposition 3 can be done by replacing the conditional distributions with their
21kernel estimators.
However, to pool across auctions with dierent numbers of actual bidders I need to assume that
the number of potential bidders is constant across auctions. Unfortunately, the number of potential
bidders is unobservable. There are methods for avoiding this complication based on the techniques
outlined in Song (2004), but they require having data on more than one bid and also being able to
interpret all bids used in the estimation procedure as order statistics. Since I only have data on the
winning bid, I am forced to take a stand regarding the number of potential bidders in an auction.32
One way to detect how many potential bidders may be present is to count the number of bidders
that actually place a bid at some point during the auction, regardless of whether this is the winning
bid or not. Yet, even this number is likely to understate how many potential bidders there really
are since some potential bidders may not bid. Therefore, I will take as the number of potential
bidders the maximum of the number of bidders bidding in any one auction. However, to lend this
assumption more credence, I will only pool similar auctions across auction days if the number of
bidders showing up at the auction house is similar on these days. In looking at the data, there is
not much variation of unique winners within any month, but there is quite a bit of variation across
months as evidenced in Table 6. Regardless, these results support further partitioning the data into
three categories based on number of potential bidders. Based on the month in which the auction
takes place, I assign it to one of these groups and within each group I assume that the same number
of potential bidders are present. The groupings by month are given in the following table:33
Group Months
A 11/02
B 10/01 11/01 12/02 1/02 5/02 7/02 8/02 9/02 10/02
C 2/02 3/02 3/02
5.1 Estimation Results
I now present my estimation results. For the time being, I focus only on ve passenger Hyundai
Sonatas with automatic transmissions that sold during the months in category B above. For these
gures I choose four combinations of mileage and age. Then for each of these four combinations,
I choose four reserve prices that are the 15th, 25th, 50th and 90th percentiles of reserve prices for
32An alternative might be to specify the distribution of potential bidders, say a Poisson distribution, and assume
that the number of actual bidders are draws from this distribution. This technique is used in Bajari and Horta csu
(2003).
33Revisions to the table were tried with minor implications for the empirical results. One potential change is to
break group B into two groups, one for late 2001, early 2002 and the other for mid-late 2002 to allow for any sector
wide changes in demand. However, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of the distributions of winning bids
for similar cars in the two groups failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
22cars with these mileage and age proles.34 I then specify both of the following models:
B = (MILEAGE;AGE;S) (16)
B = (R;MILEAGE;AGE;S) (17)
and estimate the distribution of values conditional on observables specied to aect bidder behavior.
Consider equation 16. Here I attempt to control for all observable heterogeneity by looking only at
ve passenger Hyundai Sonatas with automatic transmissions that sold during specic months when
approximately the same number of bidders showed up at the auction and including the age and
mileage of the car as determinants of bids. Therefore, the dierence between the two specications
is that the latter utilizes reserve prices to proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity in the cars. To
proceed I specify that the number of potential bidders is eight since over 92% of the auctions have
less than this many bidders placing bids above the reserve price.
To begin understanding the output of the estimation, consider Figure 2. The \atter" distri-
bution labeled \All Cars" is the estimated distribution of values for 8.5 year old cars with 150,000
KMs when I do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. The dashed lines are 95% condence
intervals. The values are in logs, so indeed there is a great variation in them even within this
transmission-make-model-passenger-mileage type of car.
The other four distributions in Figure 2 attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In
addition to age and mileage, these four distributions also control for the secret reserve price of
the Hyundai Sonatas. There is a clear ordering of the distributions in a stochastic dominance
sense: value distributions for cars with higher secret reserve prices maintain a rst order stochastic
dominance over those with lower reserve prices. This coincides with our intuition that whatever
the econometrician is not observing, the more favorable is this characteristic, the higher ought to
be both the bids and the reserve prices. Also, there is very little overlap in the distributions and
for most of the mass of the values, the distributions are fairly precisely estimated.
Percentiles of the estimated distribution of bidder values appear in Table 7. In this table \Fvall"
refers to the distribution of values not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The distributions
depend greatly on controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as the median of the value distribution
may rise more than 500% depending on its realization.
In Figure 2 the distribution labeled \All Cars" appears to maintain a second order stochastic
dominance over the distributions controlling for unobserved heterogeneity despite the fact that even
in the distribution entitled \All Cars", I have controlled for a great deal of variation: the make,
model, transmission, mileage, age, number of passengers and the time of the year. This suggests
that the reserve price is helping soak up variation in bids that otherwise we would have attributed
to variation in bidder values. This coincides with our intuition that not controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity attributes too much variation in bids to variation in bidder values. To illustrate this
34In practice I allow cars with \similar but not exactly" these covariates to enter the estimation by smoothing over
the data using a Gaussian kernel with approximately the standard choice of bandwidth of 1:06T
1
5, where  is the
sample standard deviation of the covariate suggested in Silverman (1986).
23point, I calculate the interquartile ranges for each of the distributions. The results appear in Table
8. It is clear that the estimated distributions are much more \condensed" when we control for
unobserved heterogeneity, although there doesn't seem to be much dependence of the interquartile
range on the level of unobserved heterogeneity. However, when I calculate the coecients of variation
of the distributions, the greater the age and mileage of the car, the greater is the percentage reduction
in coecients of variation when we control for unobserved heterogeneity. The percentage reduction
for the lowest and highest age and mileage prole is approximately 11% and 50% respectively.
The degree to which the rst and second order stochastic dominance relationships between the
estimated value distributions play a role in the outcome of counterfactual experiments of interest
will be explored below.
The distributions for the other age-mileage proles appear in Figure 3 where we see similar
results to those highlighted above.
Before moving on to two counterfactual experiments of interest, I explore how unobserved het-
erogeneity impacts the estimation of two objects of interest in auctions: (a) within-auction variation
in bidder values and (b) the surplus captured by bidders.
5.2 Controlling for Within-Auction Variation
Having seen that reserve prices help control for unobserved heterogeneity, I now investigate the
extent to which their inclusion can alleviate a lack of data when estimating within-auction variation
in bids. Since it is common for second price or English auction data sets to include only transaction
prices, we might wonder whether controlling for the reserve price of the item can help estimate the
amount of variation in bids for similar items, something that would be much more easily assessed
had we data on all bids within each auction. Aside from generally addressing the penalty for not
having multiple bids, these estimates may be of particular value for risk averse sellers. To analyze
this potential use of reserve prices, I use the smaller data set mentioned above which has all bids
in an auction during the last three months of 2001.
To proceed, I select similar automobiles and analyze (i) the average within-auction variation not
controlling for reserve price, (ii) the across-auction variation not controlling for reserve price and
(iii) the across-auction variation controlling for reserve price. By controlling for the reserve price, we
can determine how much of the across-auction variation is accounted for as compared to when we
have data on all bids within each auction. The results of such a test appear in Table 9. This table
focuses on ve passenger Hyundais with automatic transmissions that sold during the last three
months of 2001. It divides these cars into 16 milege/age categories dened by the quantiles of each
covariate. For each category it computes the within and across-auction variation in bids. Then,
for each mileage/age category, it separates the cars into four reserve price categories and computes
the across-auction variation in bids. First, the table clearly shows the penalty for not observing
multiple bids in an auction when estimating within-auction variation as the numbers in the top row
of the table are much smaller than those in the second row. However, a great deal of the variation
in the second row can be \soaked up" by controlling for the reserve prices. On average, ignoring
24the last row which appear to be greatly aected by outliers, controlling for the reserve price reduces
the across-auction variation in bids by 75%. This suggests that when economists face the frequent
challenge of estimating bid variation using only transaction prices, controlling for reserve prices can
ameliorate the situation a great deal.
5.3 Measuring Bidder Surplus
One consequence of failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the distribution
of bidder values is that too much variation in bids is attributed to variation in bidder values. This
leads to an overestimate of the \dispersion" of the distribution of bidder values. In this subsection
I show that this leads to an upward bias in the estimate of the surplus accruing to bidders and then
I quantify this overestimate in the data.
An overstatement of the dispersion in bidder values will lead to an upward bias in the estimate
of bidder surplus. To see this, consider any auction with N bidders with values drawn from the
distribution F. Let the winning bid in the auction be denoted w with density g(wjN) when there
are N bidders. Then, in an English button auction, the expected surplus obtained by the winning















To compare the estimate of the surplus captured by bidders when we do and do not control for
unobserved heterogeneity, I need to make a useful assumption regarding the relationship between
the two estimated value distributions. In the following proposition I assume that the dierence
between any two quantiles of the estimated distribution of bidder values which controls for un-
observed heterogeneity is less than that from the estimated distribution of values which ignores
unobserved heterogeneity. While this may not have to be true, it is a useful way to formalize the
distinction between these estimated distributions which seems to hold in this paper as well as in
others (Krasnokutskaya (2009)).
Proposition 4. Let F and G be two distributions of bidder values such that:
F 1(d)   F 1(c)  G 1(d)   G 1(c);8 0 < c  d < 1
In an English auction consisting of N bidders, the estimated surplus accruing to bidders based on
distribution F will be smaller than that based on distribution G.
To test whether the proposition holds in the data, I determine the estimated distribution of
bidder values for each age and mileage prole, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, and then condi-
tioning on its median realization I estimate the bidder surplus for each distribution by simulating
5000 auctions consisting of 3, 5 and 10 bidders. The comparison of the estimated surplus accruing
25to the winning bidder for each value distribution appears in Table 10. While the strict quantile
dominance assumption used in Proposition 4 may not hold for these distributions, it is evident
that failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to an upward bias in the estimated bidder
surplus, sometimes by as much as 40%.
5.4 Reserve Price Setting and Prot Evaluation
Reserve prices play an historically important role in the empirical auction literature as they were
some of the original policy variables of interest in such work as Paarsch (1997). To see what implica-
tion not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has for a common policy variable of interest, I now
investigate how an advisor's suggested reserve price would change based on whether the estimated
distribution of values aecting the optimal reserve price controlled for unobserved heterogeneity.
According to Equation 2, if we had values for v0, then we could estimate the optimal reserve price
both controlling and not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, I do not have
any estimates for v0, so I will simply estimate the optimal reserve prices for a variety of reasonable
values for v0.35
The estimated optimal reserve prices for each age-mileage prole and realization of unobserved
heterogeneity, b , for various values of v0, appear in Table 11. Ignoring the column which does not
control for unobserved heterogeneity, we see that within any value for v0, and within any reserve
price, as the age-mileage prole of the car goes up, the optimal reserve price falls, a sensible result.
Also within any value for v0, and within any age-mileage prole, as the reserve price category,
or unobserved heterogeneity value, of the car goes up, the optimal reserve price rises.36 This
conrms that the necessary restrictions in proposition 1 hold in the data. Also evident in Table 11,
the estimated optimal reserve price ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is always greater than the
estimated optimal reserve price for the median realization of unobserved heterogeneity. This is due
to the greater dispersion in the estimated value distribution ignoring unobserved heterogeneity.
What implication does the variation in these \optimal" reserve prices have for expected outcomes
of interest to a hypothetical seller? At the median realization of unobserved heterogeneity, the seller
that fails to correctly set the optimal reserve price due to ignoring unobserved heterogeneity suers
a loss of around 5% of revenues. Greater losses result from more extreme realizations of unobserved
heterogeneity. Part of the drop is due to an increase in the failure to sell since the optimal reserve
price will tend to be too high when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. At the median realization
of unobserved heterogeneity, cars may be twice as likely to fail to sell when the reserve price is set
ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, depending on the seller's value for the car.
There are a few caveats to the results on optimal reserve prices. The rst is that one might think
that v0 should be a function of the characteristics of the car. That is, a low v0 is likely to be more
35A similar technique is used in Haile and Tamer (2003). As noted there, unlike the requirement in Myerson
(1981) that the inverse hazard rate is strictly monotone in , not U, this procedure only requires that (;v0;FV )
is strictly pseudo-concave on A  < which means that for all distinct a1 and a2 2 A, if 
0(a1)(a2   a1)  0, then
(a2)   (a1) < 0. See Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang (1988).
36This in itself is another validation of the model since given its assumptions one should nd the optimal reserve
price increasing in U. I thank Phil Haile for highlighting this result.
26appropriate for a car with age-mileage prole 4 than 1. The second caveat is that the results in these
tables are based on estimations of equation 2, which assumes that the seller is a monopolist selling
a single good. This is not likely to be the case regardless of whether one considers the seller to be
the auction house or the individual car owners who bring their automobile to the auction house to
sell. The interpretation of the auction house as the seller is problematic because of the competition
mentioned above and it is not selling one good since it frequently sells similar cars on the same day.
Interpreting the individual car owners as the seller is problematic because they are unlikely to have
much market power. Nevertheless, the results give a benchmark for the implications for reserve
price recommendation when the advisor fails to account for unobserved heterogenetiy. Moreover,
this benchmark is relevant since there are examples where economists have treated the optimal
reserve pricing problem as though it were one faced by a (i) prot maximizing (ii) monopolist who
is (iii) selling a single good when in fact one or more of these assumptions may be false.
5.5 Price Discrimination with Unobserved Heterogeneity
It is well known that a rm could increase its prots if it could price discriminate instead of charging
a uniform price to all consumers. However, this ignores the rm's costs of undertaking such price
discrimination. For example, it may be dicult to evaluate its customer types in order to generate a
personalized price. That is, the presence of heterogeneity across automobiles, which is unobservable
to the auction house without further inspection, creates learning costs that may force it to use a
system akin to a two-part tari in order to approximate perfect price discrimination. The auction
house considered in this paper is not unique. Other auction platform operators utilize a similar fee
structure. Christie's and Sotheby's, for example, charge 15% - 20% of the item's nal selling price
but do not require at fees upfront. eBay charges a xed fee to post an item and then collects
a commission of approximately 8.75% of the winning bid. See Lucking-Reiley (2000) for more
details. In this section I evaluate how well the auction house's current pricing scheme captures its
customers' surplus in comparison to a scenario where it could perfectly price discriminate. I will
use my estimates of the distribution of bidder values to answer this question. First, I show that
under a general set of preferences and the assumption that the auction house occurs no cost in price
discriminating, that it would be better o eliminating the commission and charging each seller a
xed fee based on the car type. Next, I assume that the auction house's use of a commission and
a constant xed fee for all cars is optimal when faced with the costs of undertaking such a pricing
scheme. This allows me to pin down the primitives of the seller's demand for the auction house.
Using this parameterized demand, I estimate the optimal xed fee for each car type. Finally, I assess
the maximum of the potential gains per car from price discriminating as compared to the two-part
tari used by the auction house. In this way the section is related to the work in Chu, Leslie, and
Sorensen (2008) which evaluates the eciency of less-than-optimal, but also easier-to-implement,
nonlinear pricing schemes in theater ticket sales.
To examine the impact of altering the auction house's commission t and xed fee F, I need
to consider how each side of the market responds to a change in these prices. If we assume that
27the seller pays all of the commission, which seems reasonable given that bidders are bidding their
true values, then when the auction house raises the commission, the eective values faced by the
seller are lower. Suppose that with no commission that the distribution of bidder values is given
by Fv. Then with a commission t, the eective distribution of bidder values is given Fe v such that
Fe v(a) = Fv( a
1 t). Therefore, for any constant outside value of the car to the seller, as the auction
house raises the commission, the seller faces a less favorable distribution and so he will lower his
reserve price. His lowering the reserve price will alter the probability of sale. If r0 is the reserve
price with no commission and if rt is the reserve price when the commission is t, then as long as
rt > (1   t)r0, the probability of sale will fall since:
Pr(Salejt = 0;N) = Pr(maxi=1;:::;N(vi) > r0)
and:
Pr(Salejt > 0;N) = Pr(maxi=1;:::;N((1   t)vi) > rt)
= Pr((1   t)maxi=1;:::;N(vi) > rt)
> Pr(Salejt = 0;N) if rt < (1   t)r0
< Pr(Salejt = 0;N) if rt > (1   t)r0
I do not assume that sellers set reserve prices optimally, but if I did require this, the next proposition
shows that as t increases, the reserve price falls but that rt > (1 t)r0 implying that the probability
of failure increases. Note that the condition that the hazard rate is decreasing is a sucient but
not necessary condition for the proposition to hold.
Proposition 5. Let
1 Fv(x)
fv(x) be decreasing in x. Let r0 and rt be the optimal reserve price in
an English button auction set by the seller when the commission is 0 and t respectively. Then
(1   t)r0 < rt < r0.
While sellers will lower their reserve price as the commission increases, they will not alter their
reserve price in response to a change in the xed fee because it does not impact the eective
distribution of values they face. While it is possible that bidding behavior is aected by the impact
on reserve prices, I assume below that bidding behavior is unchanged when the commission is
altered.
I now analyze the optimal pricing decision of the auction house and show that if there were no
cost in price discriminating based on type of car, it would be optimal for it to charge 0 commission
and a car-type specic xed fee. Currently the auction house charges anyone wishing to sell their
car $50. Then, if the car sells, it collects 4.4% of the winning bid as a commission. Therefore, if we
model the seller as bearing the full 4.4%, the eective price paid by the sellers is:
P(t;F) = t(t)W + F (19)
where W is the expected winning bid for the car at the auction house, (t) is the probability that the
28car sells at a given commission t and F is the xed fee.37 The probability of sale decreases in t based
on the argument above. Let the expected gross revenue earned by the seller be R(t;F) = (t)W and
dene e P(t;F) = R(t;F)   P(t;F) as the expected cash ow of the seller who chooses the auction
house.
I now model the sellers' decision of whether or not to use the auction house. Consider the seller
of a given car. Suppose he has outside option "  G(") with associated density function g(). Let
the seller's preferences over bundles of probability of sale and prices ((t),e P(t;F)) be:38
U((t); e P(t;F)) = (t) + e P(t;F) + (1   (t))" (20)
For a given commission and xed fee, a seller will choose the auction house provided U() > ".
Suppose that the rm has 0 marginal costs and a xed cost of operating equal to . Then the
rms prot function is given:
(t;F) = P(t;F)G(U((t); e P(t;F)))    (21)
I will now argue that if the auction house has full information regarding a seller's car, it should only
charge the seller a xed fee and set the commission to zero. The intuition for the argument is that
t distorts seller decisions at the margin and hence reduces total surplus. Therefore, it is optimal for
the auction house to set a xed fee to extract expected surplus. To see this, note that the tradeo







































37Equation 19 assumes that the $50 fee is nonrefundable. This is valid if the owner of a car which failed to sell
brings the automobile back to the auction house later after taking it home since he will have to pay the $50 again.
In reality, if the owner decides to leave the car with the auction house after it failed to sell, he would not have to
pay the $50 at the next auction. The above formulation ignores this possibility. To get a sense of how often sellers
leave a car which failed to sell at the auction house, I look for cars which failed to sell one week and are then put up
for auction the next week. To do so, however, I identify cars based on their characteristics since there is no unique
identier in the data. This process reveals that during the sample period for which I have failed sales, only 1.07%
of the cars which failed to sell were left at the auction house until the next auction took place. This is based on the
mileage of the car being the same week after week, suggesting that the owners didn't take the car home only to return
the following week.
38This specication can be thought of as a rst order Taylor expansion of the seller's utility U = (t)u((1 t)W) 
F + (1   (t))" about the risk neutral payo for the seller if we normalize u((1   t)W) = (1   t)W.
29Since
@(t)
@t  0, as long as (t)W + t
@(t)
@t W  0,39 then jdF
dt Uj  jdF
dt Pj. Thus, to hold consumers
indierent to a drop in t, the rm is able to raise F by more than the amount needed to hold P(t;F)
constant. Therefore, it would seek to lower t as much as possible, i.e. set t = 0.40







g(U(0;F)), also known as the inverse of the reverse hazard rate of G(), is increasing in
W, then F will be increasing in W. While the distribution of sellers' outside option is unknown,
we can infer from the auction house's use of a at fee and a commission which is a percentage of
the winning bid, that these distributions are characterized by an increasing inverse of the reverse
hazard rate in W.
I have now shown that the auction house would be better served by charging 0% commission and
a at xed fee which varies by car. In reality they do not do this, due to the cost of undertaking
such price discrimination. In the face of these costs, I assume that their decision to set a 4.4%
commission and $50 at fee to each seller, regardless of vehicle type, is optimal, allowing me to
uncover the parameters of the model from the rst order conditions. To do this, I will have to make
some strong assumptions.
I will assume that for any car type j, the outside option of a seller is given:






where Wj and j are the mean and standard deviation of the winning bid for car type j at the
auction and  is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable. The restriction is that  and  are
constant across j. The rst order conditions evaluated at t = 4:4% and F = $50 then determine
 and . Though I condition on age and mileage and reserve price when I control for unobserved
heterogeneity, I follow the model outlined in Section 3.2 and pool across car types to estimate the
distribution of bidder values. To do so, I estimate the distribution of bidder values for every 5th
percentile of age and mileage when I ignore unobserved heterogeneity and every 10th percentile of
reserve price within any age and mileage level when I control for unobserved heterogeneity. When
I divide the cars sold by the auction house in this way, these parameterizations deliver the results
in Table 12.
With these parameters in hand, I can now perform the counterfactual exercise of estimating
the optimal xed fee in the absence of costs to price discriminating. Before moving on to the
estimation results, I must specify how sellers alter their reserve prices as a function of t. Since I do
not observe dierent values of t in the data, and since I wish to avoid assuming that sellers optimally
set their reserve prices, I cannot identify how reserve prices vary with t. I assume, therefore, that
reserve prices are held constant as t varies but that they are set relative to the winning bid net of
39This condition holds in the data used in the analysis.
40Yao and Mela (2008) nd that an online auction company could increase its revenues by reducing commissions.
30commission.41 This insures that as the commission increases, the probability of sale falls.
Table 12 shows the results for these exercises. It indicates that when ignoring unobserved
heterogeneity, there tends to be less variation in the optimal xed fees as compared to when we
control for unobserved heterogeneity. Figure 4 displays the optimal fee structure when controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity by tting a 5th order polynomial to the estimated optimal fees and
comparing it to the current two-part tari used by the auction house. First, we can see why the
current pricing scheme is used: the two-part tari approximates the increasing nature of the optimal
xed fees in the expected winning bid of the cars. Second we can see that the current pricing scheme
subsidizes the sellers of more expensive automobiles by \overcharging" the sellers of less expensive
cars. This may make sense when aspects of the model which were abstracted from above, such as
the reputation eects associated the auction house's repeat purchasers, are taken into consideration.
In terms of measuring the potential gains from price discrimination, the bias of ignoring unobserved
heterogeneity in this analysis is as expected: controlling for unobserved heterogeneity allows the
auction house to more perfectly price discriminate and therefore extract more of the seller's surplus.
The magnitude of this bias, however, demonstrates that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can
substantially reduce the estimated potential gains from price discriminating, here by over 70%. The
potential gains from price discriminating can be compared to the current average revenue per car
of $165.08. Taken together, these results suggest that while the auction house's current pricing
scheme may approximate the increasing nature of the optimal xed fees, it may be forgoing over
6% of revenue by not price discriminating, and potentially a much greater percentage of prots,
and these losses would be substantially underestimated if we ignored unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion
The existing empirical auction literature has improved our understanding of how a variety of auctions
operate in practice and has answered questions of practical importance such as revenue maximizing
design, the detection of collusion and the estimation of rm markups. Much of this literature is
hampered, however, by ignoring unobserved heterogeneity. While several recent attempts have been
made to combat this outstanding empirical issue, the current methods sometimes impose potentially
unpalatable modeling assumptions and strict data requirements.
The current paper proposes a new methodology which relies on using information from the
behavior of individuals other than bidders (who are the only auction participants currently used
in eorts to control for unobserved heterogeneity), namely sellers, to help control for what the
researcher doesn't observe in the data. Oftentimes such seller behavior is available. Though this
paper suggests the use of reserve prices, similar seller choice variables such as engineer estimates
in procurement auctions or the decision of when to hold an auction, say on eBay, might also be
employed. The solution relies on a strict monotonicity assumption in the seller behavior which
is intuitively plausible and, while not required in the model, generally is the outcome of optimal
41I also experimented with parameterizing the reserve prices as functions of t. In particular I used the function
r(t) =  k arctan(t) + 1 for dierent values of k with no real changes to the results.
31seller behavior. While I propose a general nonparametric solution to the problem, I also present a
common single index assumption to reduce dimensionality problems. After deriving its asymptotic
distribution, my nonparametric estimator of the distribution of bidder values in used car auctions
clearly shows the severity of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, I demonstrate several applications and consequences of utilizing reserve prices to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity. First, reserve prices are shown to be particularly useful when
attempting to determine within-auction variation in bids when only single bids per auction are
available as data. I show that utilizing reserve prices allows us on average to reduce estimates of
the within-auction variation in bids by an average of 75%. Second, I show that the previously held
belief that a failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overestimate of the variation
in bidder values indeed holds in my estimation results. More generally, I show that when this is
the case, we will tend to overestimate the amount of surplus accruing to the winning bidder. In my
data, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overestimate of bidder surplus of approximately
30%. Third, I analyze the ramications of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the
optimal reserve price. In my data this can lead to a substantial drop in expected revenues and an
increased tendency for the item to go unsold. Fourth, I evaluate the potential gains to the auction
house from price discriminating based on a car's attributes. I claim that when there is heterogeneity
across vehicle types, which is unobservable to the auction house without incurring learning costs,
this will lead the auction house to forgo perfect price discrimination in favor of a two-part tari. I
show that in the absence of such costs, the potential gains from price discriminating are as much
as 5% of revenues and that these gains are underestimated if we ignore unobserved heterogeneity.
32Appendix A: Monte Carlo Study
In this section I perform a monte carlo study to test the two step estimation procedure. First,
I mimic the reserve pricing data by generating data consisting of two covariates, Z0 and Z1, a
random shock U by letting (i) Z0 = zH
0 with probability p and Z0 = zL
0 with probability 1   p, (ii)
Z1  N(H
Z1;Z1) when Z0 = zH
0 and Z1  N(L
Z1;Z1) when Z0 = zL
0 and (iii) U  N(H
U ;U)
when Z0 = zH
0 and U  N(L
U;U) when Z0 = zL
0 . Then, I generate reserve prices by R =
m(Z0;Z1;U) = Z1(0Z0 + 1Z1) + U so that u = m(z0;0;u) for all z0 and u and, by the data
generating process, U is independent of Z1 conditional on Z0. Next, I create a grid of values for
Z0, Z1 and U that contains 97.5% of the support of these variables and, for each grid point, I
form R according to above function. Then I draw T values of Z0, Z1 and U and then compute R
according to m(). For these T data points, I assume that I only would have seen the outcomes Z0,
Z1 and R. I then estimate FUjZ0=zH
0 , FUjZ0=zL
0 and the function m() according to the procedure
outlined above. Then, I repeat S times. The specics of the design and the results appear in Table
13. Figure 5 shows that the estimator approximates the true distribution quite well with the true
distribution almost always falling within its 95% bootstrapped condence intervals.
Now I am interested in evaluating how well performing the rst stage estimation can help in
estimating the distribution of bidder values when there is unobserved heterogeneity. Based on my
rst stage estimates of the function m(), I can recover the realization of unobserved heterogeneity
and then simulate T English (or equivalently second price) auctions in which for any auction t there
are Nt bidders whose values are distributed according to F which depends upon the realization of
U according to: F : Normal(U;). Then, assuming only that I have data on the transaction price
from these auctions, I attempt to estimate this distribution via maximum likelihood if I know that V
is distributed normally and I (i) know the actual realization of the unobserved heterogeneity (\Full
Information"), (ii) know that there is unobserved heterogeneity, but must calculate it from the rst
stage (\Partial Information") and (iii) do not know that there is any unobserved heterogeneity (\No
Information"). I estimate the parameters  and  by maximum likelihood where the likelihood
function relating transaction prices, wt, to the distribution of values in English or second price





nt(nt   1)F(wt)(nt 2)(1   F(wt))f(wt) (26)
I then repeat this process M times. The results appear in Table 14. It is apparent that in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, while the estimator is outperformed by the scenario where
we know the actual realizations of the unobserved heterogeneity, it works a great deal better than
ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity all together.
33Appendix C: Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof. Aliation between V and U with joint density f provides that for all v1 < v2 and u1 < u2:
f(v1;u2)f(v2;u1) < f(v1;u1)f(v2;u2)




























It is well known that the optimal reserve price for such a seller with cost equal to v0 is dened
by Equation 3. Therefore, if r













Proof. Beginning with reserve prices, we can identify the conditional distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity as follows: FRj(Z0;Z1)=(z0;z1)(u) = Pr[R < uj(Z0;Z1) = (z0;z1)] = Pr[m(Z0;Z1;U) <
uj(Z0;Z1) = (z0;z1)] = Pr[U < uj(Z0;Z1) = (z0;z1)] = Pr[U < ujZ0 = z0] = FUjZ0=z0(u), where
the third equality comes from the normalization of m in assumption (i), and the fourth comes from
the conditional independence assumption (ii). Also, we note that: FUjZ0=z0(u) = Pr[U < ujZ0 =
z0] = Pr[U < uj(Z0;Z1) = (z0;z1)] = Pr[m(Z0;Z1;U) < m(z0;z1;u)j(Z0;Z1) = (z0;z1)] = Pr[R <
m(z0;z1;u)j(Z0;Z1) = (z0;z1)] = FRj(Z0;Z1)=(z0;z1)(m(z0;z1;u)), where the second equality again




Now, with data on reserve prices, R, and item characteristics Z, due to the strict monotonicity of
m(;U) for each (R;Z) pair there will be a unique realization of U satisfying R = m(Z;U).
Let W0 = [Z;U]. Using only transaction prices, we can identify F(SjW0) in a rst price and
second price auction using the arguments of Theorems 6 and 1, respectively, in Athey and Haile
34(2002). Q.E.D.
Proposition 3
Proof. Let regularity conditions C.1-C.5 from Matzkin (2003), p.1356, hold. From equation ??
we know that  1(b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)) = (b FV j ~ Z=~ z(v)) where  1() is a known continuously dierentiable






b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)   FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)
i
!




T . Therefore, we can take a rst-order, Taylor-series
expansion of (b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)) about (FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)) to get:
(b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))) = (FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)) + 0(FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))
h





00(FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))
2
h
b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)   FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)
i2
!
Rearranging and multiplying through by T we get:
T
h
(b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))   (FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))
i
= 0(FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))T
h
b FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)   FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)
i
+ op(1)
Therefore, by the continuous mapping theorem and the denition of ():
T
h




VFV = 0(FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))VFW0(FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))
=
VFW







FWj ~ Z=~ z(v)(1   FWj ~ Z=~ z(v))
i
=f(~ z)
by Matzkin (2003). Q.E.D.
Proposition 4
Proof. This proof is based on work by Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994). Rewriting the supposition,
G 1(F(v1))   v1  G 1(F(v2))   v2 for all v1  v2. For any collection of N values drawn from
a distribution H, order them such that vH
1  vH
2  :::  vH
N, with vH
(i:N) = vH
i . Therefore, the
expected surplus in any given English auction with N bidders whose values are thought to be
drawn from F (G) will be given by S(F) = E[vF
N   vF









N 1)). Now, the joint distribution of vG
N
and vG
N 1 is the same as the joint distribution of G 1(F(vF
N)) and G 1(F(vF
N 1)) and therefore
S(F) < S(G). Q.E.D.
Proposition 5
Proof. Let the seller have an outside value for the car equal to v0. Let Fv be the distribution
of bidder values when the commission is 0. The seller, selecting his reserve price in an English
button auction when the commission is t, will consider himself to be facing values e v = (1   t)v.
Let the distribution of eective values faced by a seller when the commission is t be Fe v;t. Note
that Fe v(a) = Fv( a






1 t. The optimal reserve price set by a seller when the
commission is 0 is given by:
r0 = v0 +
1   Fv (r0)
fv (r0)
When the commission is t, the optimal reserve price is given by:
rt = v0 +
1   Fe v;t (rt)
fe v;t (rt)















Recall that by the supposition,
1 Fv(r)
fv(r) is decreasing in r.
Dene (r)  r v0 
1 Fe v;t(r)
fe v;t(r) and note that (rt) = 0. I will now show that (1 t)r0 < rt < r0.
First, I will show that ((1 t)rt) < 0 implying that rt > (1 t)r0. Then, I will show that (r0) > 0
implying that rt < r0. I will occasionally refer to Figure 6 to help demonstrate the intuition.
To show that rt > (1   t)r0, note that:















= (1   t)v0 +
1   Fe v;t ((1   t)r0)
fe v;t ((1   t)r0)
< v0 +
1   Fe v;t ((1   t)r0)
fe v;t ((1   t)r0)
Therefore, ((1   t)rt) < 0. Graphically, this is shown by comparing point A to point C in Figure
6.
36To show that rt < r0, note that:
v0 +
1   Fe v;t (r0)
fe v;t (r0)



























1   Fv (r0)
fv (r0)
= r0
Therefore, (r0) > 0. Graphically, this is shown by comparing point B to the 45 line in Figure 6.
Thus we have shown (1   t)r0 < rt < r0, depicted in Figure 6 by point C.
Q.E.D.
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40Table 1: Auction Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 25th-tile Median 75th-tile
WINNING BID (in $) 2948.72 2629.63 910.00 2390.00 4290.00
RESERVE PRICE (in $) 2691.87 2569.76 700.00 2100.00 4000.00
WINNING BID/RESERVE PRICE 1.25 0.58 1.03 1.10 1.25
WINNING BID - RESERVE PRICE (in $) 256.84 267.45 60.00 180.00 380.00
NUMBER OF UNIQUE BIDS 4.90 2.32 3.00 4.00 6.00
AGE (in months) 76.47 28.40 59.00 81.00 98.00
MILEAGE (in 100,000 km's) 1.01 0.49 0.68 1.00 1.30
AUTOMATIC 0.58 0.49 0 0 1
PASSENGERS 0.98 0.12 1 1 1
MAKE
HYUNDAI 0.44 0.49 0 0 1
DAEWOO 0.36 0.48 0 0 1
KIA 0.20 0.40 0 0 0
There are 8,589 observations of each variable and the time period is 10/10/2001-11/27/2002.
Table 2: Bidder Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 25th-tile Median 75th-tile
DISTANCE (in 100 km's) 1.04 0.80 0.42 1.06 1.06
TOTAL NUMBER OF 22.30 37.23 3.00 10.00 25.00
AUCTIONS WON
NUMBER OF AUCTIONS 2.32 2.03 1.00 2.00 3.00
WON PER DAY
NUMBER OF AUCTIONS 145.58 58.04 104.00 140.00 183.00
HELD PER DAY
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT 9.62 10.96 2.00 5.00 13.00
DAYS BIDDING
The time period is from 10/10/2001-11/27/2002.
All variables are averages across either days or bidders.
The variable DISTANCE measures the distance between the auction house and the centroid of the
winning bidder's province.
41Table 3: Winning Bid Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AGE -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 -0.004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
MILEAGE -0.026 -0.024 -0.030 -0.024 -0.030 -0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
AUTOMATIC 0.423 0.419 0.411 0.405 0.399 0.091
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
PASSENGERS 0.391 0.378 0.375 0.374 0.370 0.092
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.019)
DISTANCE 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.012 0.013 -0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007)
LOG RESERVE PRICE 0.749
(0.004)
MAKE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
MODEL DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
MONTH DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES
COLOR DUMMIES NO NO YES NO YES YES
PROVINCE DUMMIES NO NO NO YES YES YES
N 8,589 8,589 8,589 8,589 8,589 8,589
R2 0.836 0.840 0.846 0.841 0.847 0.966
Dependent variable is the log of the winning bid in each auction.
The data are conditional on the object selling.
, ,  imply signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
42Table 4: Reserve Price Determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AGE -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.031
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
MILEAGE -0.019 -.016 -0.026 -0.023
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
AUTOMATIC 0.441 0.434 0.433 0.426
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
PASSENGERS 0.416 0.402 0.395 0.382
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
MAKE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
MODEL DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
MONTH DUMMIES NO YES NO YES
COLOR DUMMIES NO NO YES YES
N 8,589 8,589 8,589 8,589
R2 0.821 0.825 0.827 0.831
Dependent variable is the log of the reserve price in each auction.
The data are conditional on the object selling.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Percentile Estimates of the Distributions of Bidder Values, at Mileage, Age and Reserve
Price Points
Distributions:
Percentile Fvall Fv(R1) Fv(R2) Fv(R3) Fv(R4)
1: 5 years, 50,000 kms
25 7.71 7.25 7.42 7.76 8.13
50 8.13 7.58 7.77 8.12 8.53
75 8.48 7.90 8.13 8.43 8.90
95 8.92 8.33 8.63 8.83 9.40
2: 6.5 years, 100,000 kms
25 7.12 5.75 7.05 7.40 7.69
50 7.71 6.24 7.48 7.75 8.06
75 8.15 6.67 7.83 8.09 8.39
95 8.69 7.07 8.26 8.53 8.81
3: 7.5 years, 125,000 kms
25 5.70 5.42 6.99 7.16 7.42
50 7.39 5.79 7.38 7.54 7.77
75 7.90 6.26 7.73 7.87 8.11
95 8.44 6.88 8.18 8.31 8.55
4: 8.5 years, 150,000 kms
25 5.09 5.18 5.45 7.00 7.25
50 6.12 5.58 5.86 7.36 7.59
75 7.66 6.08 6.32 7.69 7.93
95 8.21 6.71 6.88 8.14 8.37
Results are for 5 passenger Hyundai Sonatas with automatic transmissions sold in
month group B. This assumes the number of potential bidders equals 8. The
percentiles cutos are in logs. \R#" signies a certain reserve price with greater
#'s signifying greater reserve prices. Respectively, they are the 15th, 25th, 50th
and 90th percentiles of reserve prices for cars conditional on age and mileage.
Fvall ignores unobserved heterogeneity.
45Table 8: Estimates of the Interquartile Range of the Value Distributions
Distributions:
(Mileage, Age) Point Fvall Fv(R1) Fv(R2) Fv(R3) Fv(R4)
(0.50, 5.5) 0.77 0.65 0.71 0.67 0.78
(1.00, 6.5) 1.02 0.92 0.78 0.69 0.70
(1.25, 7.5) 0.99 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.69
(1.50, 8.5) 1.80 0.94 0.68 0.69 0.68
Results are for 5 passenger Hyundai Sonatas with automatic transmissions sold
in month group B. This assumes the number of potential bidders equals 8.
MILEAGE and AGE are in 100,000 km's and months, respectively. The IQRs are
in logs. \R#" signies a certain reserve price with greater #'s signifying greater
reserve prices. Respectively, they are the 15th, 25th, 50th and 90th percentiles of
reserve prices for cars conditional on age and mileage. Fvall ignores unobserved
heterogeneity.
Table 9: Controlling for Within Bid Variation
Mileage Group (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 110.8 102.2 98.1 90.3 99.1 95.5 106.0 86.0 102.7 95.2 100.6 84.3 94.2 99.6 87.3 76.4
Across 2359.0 1866.9 968.2 1644.4 2012.6 1479.6 1607.0 1368.5 3019.2 1574.3 1786.3 1186.8 1872.1 1290.0 893.9 615.1
Across, by Reserve Group
(1) 806.9 596.6 347.9 508.8 335.0 656.8 308.0 146.4 433.9 492.6 228.1 207.9 661.9 240.1 266.5 261.0
(2) 361.7 276.3 454.6 482.9 435.8 222.4 491.2 303.9 344.9 387.5 424.9 250.8 348.5 292.0 251.7 169.4
(3) 337.5 324.8 316.0 306.8 290.8 535.4 425.8 304.5 436.9 303.6 340.2 217.8 503.1 438.3 327.6 164.4
(4) 2553.4 3116.7 978.1 1050.7 2802.2 1743.0 1348.7 2126.3 5183.2 1570.1 2206.1 1570.0 2282.5 879.0 760.7 1089.5
This table displays either Across-auction or Within-auction standard deviation of bids.
Mileage groups are quartiles of mileage for this type of car during these months that successfully sold.
Age groups are quartiles of age for this type of car during these months that successfully sold conditional on mileage category.
Reserve groups are quartiles of reserve price for this type of car during these months that successfully sold conditional on mileage and age category.
Results are for 5 passenger Hyundais with automatic transmissions sold between October and December, 2001.
Table 10: Estimated Surplus
Bidders N = 3 N = 5 N = 10
(Mileage, Age) Point Fvall Fv(R3) Fvall Fv(R3) Fvall Fv(R3)
1 2006.65 1656.48 1864.15 1475.70 1805.47 1351.65
2 1764.98 1266.95 1554.70 1170.08 1445.06 1121.64
3 1592.91 1020.52 1350.74 927.66 1230.16 864.67
4 1395.57 848.15 1265.90 782.03 996.50 721.71



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 12: Optimal Fixed Fees
Parameters: Percentiles of F:
Controlling?   25th 50th 75th Gains/car
No 0.957 0.120 $95.39 $191.61 $213.95 $2.87
Yes 0.930 0.133 $89.13 $158.84 $251.78 $10.50
The table shows the impact of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity when measuring
the gains from price discriminating. The gains are measured relative to the current
pricing scheme used by the auction house.








U U Z1 0 1
306 200 -1 1 0.5 -2.5 2.5 1 -4.5 4.5 2.5 0 1 2
Average Performance of Estimator for m
Bias Variance MSE
-0.130 1.580 63.970








Table 14: Monte Carlo Design for Testing Performance of Estimator of Value Distribution
Parameter  
NI PI FI NI PI FI
Truth 6 1.5
Bias -0.279 -0.019 0.002 0.254 0.044 -0.012
Variance 0.002 0.032 0.00004 0002 0.002 0.001
MSE 0.080 0.032 0.00005 0.067 0.004 0.002
\NI", \PI" and \FI" stand for \No", \Partial" and \Full" Information respectively, the meanings of
which are described in the text.
MC Parameters: M = 100, T = 500, Nt = 5.
logLNI = -698.1, logLPI = -639.2 and logLFI = -614.1
48Figure 1: Top row: Plot of winning bid and reserve price and of residuals from regressions of
winning bid and reserve price on car characteristics, respectively, for cars that sold on a randomly
chosen day. Bottom row: Plot of winning bid and reserve price and of residuals from regressions of
winning bid and reserve price on car characteristics, respectively, for cars that did not sell on the
same randomly chosen day.
49Figure 2: Estimated Value Distributions, Not Controlling and Controlling for Unobserved Hetero-
geneity with Condence Intervals: Automatic, 5 Passenger, Hyundai Sonatas, (MILEAGE,AGE)
Point 4, Month Category B












Conditional on [Mileage (in 100k KMs), Age (in Years)] = [1.5,8.5]
Reserve Prices Increasing for Greater #









50Figure 3: Estimated Value Distributions, Not Controlling and Controlling for Unobserved Hetero-
geneity: Automatic, 5 Passenger, Hyundai Sonatas, Month Category B







Conditional on [Mileage (in 100k KMs), Age (in Years)] = [0.5,5]
Reserve Prices Increasing for Greater #
Bidder Values (in logs)
 
 







Conditional on [Mileage (in 100k KMs), Age (in Years)] = [1,6.5]
Reserve Prices Increasing for Greater #
Bidder Values (in logs)
 
 







Conditional on [Mileage (in 100k KMs), Age (in Years)] = [1.25,7.5]
Reserve Prices Increasing for Greater #
Bidder Values (in logs)
 
 







Conditional on [Mileage (in 100k KMs), Age (in Years)] = [1.5,8.5]
Reserve Prices Increasing for Greater #























51Figure 4: Plot of estimated 5th order polynomial t of optimal xed fees per car






































Price at Auction House vs. Winning Bid
 
 
Polynomial Fit of Optimal Fee
Actual Pricing Plan
52Figure 5: Estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity: Monte Carlo results.
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54